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I. INTRODUCTION: THE REASON FOR
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Although Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) provides economic
benefits to host nations, the findings in this Article indicate that government
and private reports overstate the value of foreign investment and understate
its costs and risks. This Article focuses on several specific adverse effects of
FDI. First, promoted through free trade and bilateral agreements, foreign
investment provides value to the U.S., but it may contribute to income gaps
among individuals. Second, through inward and outward FDI, U.S.
corporations avoid taxation through operating in tax haven nations, thereby
contributing to inequities. Third, sovereign wealth funds and state operated
enterprises are investors with political motivations that may harm U.S.
interests. The United Nations 2013 World Investment Report found that stateowned corporations increased from 650 to 845 from 2010 to 2012.2 Their
FDI flows of $145 billion were almost 11% of global FDI.3 Fourth, the
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Citizens United redistributed political
influence and power from individuals to corporate and other business entities,
1
The author is professor of law at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. The views expressed in
this Article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government,
Department of Army, or Department of Defense.
2
Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, WORLD INV. REPORT 2013 i, xiv
(2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf.
3
Id.
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which are influenced by foreign nations and firms.4
FDI has an enormous influence on U.S. affairs because its financial
value is significant. In 2013, the total of all FDI in the U.S. was $4.6 trillion,
when measured by U.S. assets of foreign affiliates, and FDI inflows totaled
$193 billion, according to the U.S. government.5 In 2013, the World Bank
concluded that the U.S. was the world’s second largest recipient of FDI, with
$295 billion, following China’s $348 billion.6 This Article describes how,
with so much money at stake, certain problems have become more acute, such
as tax avoidance, theft of trade secrets, bribery, and economic espionage. But,
the problem that may surpass all the others is the newfound ability of foreign
corporations to influence American elections through their U.S. subsidiaries.
Ultimately, the benefits of FDI exceed the costs, but the U.S. will need to
acquire much more information on foreign entities that invest in U.S.
companies.
With exceptions concerning national security, the U.S. government’s
position toward foreign investment was one of neutrality, although in recent
years, for the first time, the Bush and Obama Administrations sought
vigorously to promote FDI.7 Despite China’s advances, the U.S. is considered
by corporations to be the most attractive place for FDI and from 2006 to 2013
received the most total FDI.8 In 1977, the Carter Administration neither
favored nor disfavored inward or outward foreign investment.9 Its policy was
that “international investment will generally result in the most efficient
allocation of economic resources if it is allowed to flow according to market
forces; there is no basis for concluding that a general policy of actively
promoting or discouraging international investment would further the U.S.
national interest.”10 The Reagan Administration focused on preventing trade
barriers and supporting private foreign investment in less developed
countries, and the Clinton Administration supported the Multilateral
Agreement on Investment draft, which would have created a more uniform
4

See generally Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Winning Business Investment in the United States, DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1, 8 (May 2014), http://ww
w.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/winning_business_investment_in_the_united_states.pdf.
6
Foreign direct investment, net inflows, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.KLT
.DINV.CD.WD/countries?display=default (last visited Mar. 7, 2015).
7
See Toluse Olorunnipa, Obama Seeks Boost in Foreign Investment at SelectUSA Summit,
BLOOMBERG, http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-03-23/obama-seeking-to-boost-foreigninvestment-at-selectusa-summit (last updated Mar. 23, 2015, 3:21 PM); Joanna Rubin Travalini,
Symposium on the Globalization of Private Equity: Changes in the International Market and the Impact
on Private Equity Investment: Comment: Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Achieving a
Balance Between National Economy Benefits and National Security Interests, 29 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
779, 791 (2009).
8
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 2–3.
9
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33984, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: CURRENT
ISSUES 3 (2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/139257.pdf.
10
Id. (citing The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign
Investments in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 96th
Cong. 61 (1979)).
5
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regulatory system of foreign investment in nations.11
Despite the threat of global terrorism during his Administration
(2001–2009), President Bush concluded that, “[w]hile my Administration
will continue to take every necessary step to protect national security, my
Administration recognizes that our prosperity and security are founded on our
country’s openness.”12 In 2007, the International Trade Administration,
within the Department of Commerce, announced Invest in America, a
program designed to attract FDI.13 In 2008, President Bush said:
The Executive Order reaffirms our commitment to open
economies and our policy of welcoming foreign investment
and the important economic benefits that such investment
brings. At the same time, the Executive Order sets forth
procedures for protecting our national security, recognizing
that our openness is vital to our prosperity and security.14
The Obama Administration has more vigorously encouraged foreign
investment. The Administration has directed staff at foreign embassies to find
private investors and cabinet secretaries to lobby foreign CEOs.15 In 2011, it
created SelectUSA, a program in the Commerce Department that helps
foreign companies identify tax incentives, and established a $1 trillion
investment initiative through the President’s Council on Jobs and
Competiveness.16
Despite its salutary economic effects, FDI is often accompanied by
undesirable individual, corporate, and state crime, including tax evasion or
avoidance, theft of trade secrets, economic espionage, and bribery. The U.S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) prohibits bribery of foreign officials
and, as a means to detect and prosecute bribery, requires companies to keep
certain books and records.17 The FCPA has wide extraterritorial application,
potentially applying “to any individual, firm, officer, director, employee, or

11

Id.
Id. at 16 (citing Office of the Press Sec’y, President Bush’s Statement on Open Economies, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE (May 10, 2007), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/prsrl/2007/84660.htm).
13
Commerce to Launch New Federal Initiative to Attract Foreign Investment, INT’L TRADE ADMIN.
(Mar. 7, 2007), http://www.trade.gov/press/press_releases/2007/investamerica_030707.asp.
14
Mike Godfrey, Bush and Paulson Comment on Foreign Investment in United States, TAX-NEWS
(Jan. 24, 2008), http://www.tax-news.com/news/Bush_And_Paulson_Comment_On_Foreign_Investment
_In_United_States____29736.html.
15
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 14.
16
Id. at 12; see also Recommendations from the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness,
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 16, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/recomme
ndations-from-the-presidents-council-on-jobs-and-competitiveness/2011/10/14/gIQAJuAApL_story.htm
l.
17
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2012); Stacey L. McGraw & Stacey E. Rufe, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: An Overview of the Law and Coverage–Related Issues, AM. BAR ASS'N (Mar. 21, 2014), http://apps.a
mericanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/janfeb2014-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.html.
12
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agent of a firm and any stockholder acting on behalf of a firm[]”18 anywhere
in the world, so long as a firm or person is a securities issuer in the U.S., a
domestic concern, or a foreign national or business.19 As of 2014, eight of the
ten largest U.S. settlements under the FCPA involved foreign companies from
developed nations, and all of the settlements were with firms in nations that
are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”).20 In recent years (2006–2013), the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission has brought from about eight to eighteen civil
enforcement actions per year.21 The settlements from just a five-year period
total $3.82 billion.22 The top U.S. settlements under the FCPA were:
1. Siemens (Germany): $800 million in 2008.
2. KBR / Halliburton (USA): $579 million in 2009.
3. BAE (UK): $400 million in 2010.
4. Total S.A. (France): $398 million in 2013.
5. Alcoa (U.S.): $384 million in 2014.
6. Snamprogetti Netherlands B.V. /
(Holland/Italy): $365 million in 2010.

ENI

S.p.A

7. Technip S.A. (France): $338 million in 2010.
8. JGC Corporation (Japan): $218.8 million in 2011.
9. Daimler AG (Germany): $185 million in 2010.
10. Weatherford International (Switzerland): $152.6 million
in 2013.23
One might conclude that such established firms (KBR/Halliburton, Siemens,
BAE, Total S.A., Alcoa, and Daimler, for example) from these advanced
18
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Antibribery Provisions, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July 22, 2004),
http://acfcs.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/FCPA-DoJ-Laypersons-Guide.pdf.
19
“Under the FCPA, U.S. jurisdiction over corrupt payments to foreign officials depends upon
whether the violator is an ‘issuer,’ a ‘domestic concern,’ or a foreign national or business.” Id. “An ‘issuer’
is a corporation that has issued securities that have been registered in the United States or who is required
to file periodic reports with the SEC. Id. A “domestic concern,” on the other hand, “is any individual who
is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States, or any corporation, partnership, association, jointstock company, business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship.” Id. A domestic
concern “has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the laws of a
State of the United States, or a territory, possession, or commonwealth of the United States.” Id.
20
Richard L. Cassin, Alcoa Lands 5th on our Top Ten List, THE FCPA BLOG (Jan. 10, 2014, 1:08
AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/1/10/alcoa-lands-5th-on-our-top-ten-list.html;
Largest
Settlements Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.co
m/interactive/2012/09/03/business/largest-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-settlemments.html?ref=global;
List of OECD Member Countries – Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, OECD, http://www/oecd.
org/about/membersandpartners/list-oecd-member-countries.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
21
SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotligh
t/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
22
Cassin, supra note 20.
23
Id.
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nations (United States, Germany, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy,
France, Hungary, and Switzerland) would not be involved in bribery, unless
the crime is a pervasive practice in foreign investment.24
Despite such recurring risks, the United States’ experience with FDI
has been profitable, albeit limited mainly to firms from ten developed nations
(United Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Switzerland,
France, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Australia).25 By 2012, FDI was about
16% of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”).26 This is “the net book
value of foreign direct investors’ equity in, and outstanding loans to, their
affiliates in the United States.”27 Still, with technology and the easy
movement of firms across national borders, the mechanics of transnational
crimes are far different now when compared with the clunky clandestine
meetings of the past that were the gravamen of bribing and spying. The theft
of trade secrets, another historic act of state and firms, can be accomplished
from computers in Beijing or Moscow and through employees’ collecting
their firms’ information on discs for the benefit of a foreign country or firm.
China and Russia present unique challenges because they have
vigorous programs through which they sanction and participate in stealing
trade secrets and classified government information.28 By one estimate,
China steals intellectual property in the U.S. valued at between $50 and $100
billion a year, with a loss twice as large if the U.S. global economy is
considered.29 In gaining international influence, especially in the Pacific,
China often provides nations with significant military hardware and
technology.30
Aside from the risks presented by state-sponsored crime, FDI in the
U.S. provides many benefits. Foreign firms necessarily employ U.S. workers.
As noted below, through bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”) between the
U.S. and the foreign firms’ home nations, the firms may take their disputes
with the U.S. government to binding arbitration rather than to federal court,
24

Id.
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1, 6 (Oct. 2013), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/2013fdi_report_-_final_for_web.pdf.
26
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, ORG. FOR INT'L INV. 1, 1 (2013), http://www.ofii.org
/sites/default/files/FDIUS_2013_Report.pdf.
27
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21857, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 n.3 (2013), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=2208&context=key_workplace.
28
Foreign Spies Stealing U.S. Economic Secrets in Cyberspace: Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage, 2009–2011, OFFICE OF NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
EXEC. 1, 5 (Oct. 2011), http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Economic_Collection
_2011.pdf.
29
C. Fred Bergsten, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ., The United States in the World Economy, Speech
delivered at the Chautauqua Lecture Series, “The US Economy: Beyond a Quick Fix” (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=1905.
30
Jeryl Bier, Pentagon: Military Losing Technological Superiority to China, THE WEEKLY
STANDARD (Nov. 6, 2014, 9:04 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/pentagon-military-losingtechnological-superiority-china_818298.html#!.
25
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where all U.S. firms must go. Sovereign wealth funds, as passive investors,
may receive favorable tax treatment that is unavailable to U.S. firms.31 FDI
is valuable to the U.S., but the government should tread more lightly in
extolling its virtues, especially because future FDI will bring new costs and
risks.
II. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS, ILLUSIONS, AND FUTURE OF FDI
A. Benefits and Costs
Inward FDI means generally that firms operating in a host nation are
controlled by firms rooted in another nation. Under the Code of Federal
Regulations, “Foreign direct investment in the United States means the
ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person of 10 per
centum or more of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S. business
enterprise or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business
enterprise, including a branch.”32 In determining what companies must report
to it, the U.S. Commerce Department characterizes foreign interests as:
All U.S. business enterprises in which a foreign person (in
the broad legal sense, including a company) owns directly
and/ or indirectly a ten-percent-or-more voting interest (or
the equivalent) are subject to these [government] reporting
requirements. This includes foreign ownership of real estate,
improved and unimproved, except residential real estate held
exclusively for personal use and not for profit making
purposes.33
FDI in the U.S. comprises foreign parent firms’ equity contributions,
reinvestments of earnings of the U.S. affiliates, and loans to the affiliates.34
Equity contributions include the parent firms’ establishment of new affiliates
or the acquisition of additional interests in current affiliates; capital
contributions to affiliates; and the use of stock to acquire existing
businesses.35
Foreign investment creates jobs with wages that are 33% higher than
those in other U.S. jobs because foreign companies invest in knowledge-based
31
Rufus V. Rhoades & Alexey Manasuev, Practical Tax Considerations for Sovereign Wealth Fund
Investments in the U.S., LEXISNEXIS LEGAL NEWSROOM TAX LAW (Jan. 2, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://www.lex
isnexis.com/legalnewsroom/tax-law/b/stateandlocaltaxation/archive/2012/01/02/practical-tax-considerati
ons-for-sovereign-wealth-fund-investments-in-the-u-s.aspx.
32
15 C.F.R. § 806.15(a)(1) (2013).
33
Current Reporting Requirements for BEA Surveys of Foreign Direct Investment in the United States,
U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS 1, 1 (Nov. 2014), http://www.bea.gov/surveys/pdf/current_Reporting_
Requirements.pdf.
34
Marilyn Ibarra-Caton & Raymond J. Mataloni Jr., Direct Investment Positions for 2013, U.S.
BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS 1, 5 (July 2014), http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/2014/07%20July/0714_direct_
investment_positions.pdf.
35
Id. at 8.
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and high-skilled industries.36 The foreign-based jobs pay about $77,000 in
yearly compensation per employee, where the average compensation for all
workers is about $58,000.37 The higher pay and greater performance of the
U.S. affiliates of foreign firms is partly to be expected. With globalized
marketplaces, today’s worldwide FDI is out of all proportion to the past. For
example, the larger average size of the factories of foreign firms in the U.S.
are due to foreign investors focusing on larger and higher capital-intensity
plants to minimize the risk of investing abroad, especially in automobile
factories in the U.S.38
Globalized foreign investment on a large scale is new, and so are the
foreign firms’ factories, which provide greater productivity than older U.S.based factories.39 Large foreign firms are relatively likely to have proven
technologies that they want to transport to the U.S. to engage the large
consumer market. Moreover, foreign firms operating in the U.S. experience
relatively high costs due to labor costs and government regulation. They are
unlikely to start new plants in the U.S. unless they can do so in states that do
not have a strong union presence and are willing to provide incentives to the
companies, which included Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee.40
B. The Illusion of FDI
Restraint should temper the exuberance over FDI, especially the
investments of U.S. companies in other countries (“outward FDI”). For
example, FDI, as now counted, may amount to U.S. firms’ shuffling assets
from one nation to another to avoid taxation. This is not usually illegal, but
when the assets are transferred across borders they may count as foreign
investment but provide little or no value to any company or country. In 2013,
U.S. companies directed over 70% of outward FDI to eleven countries:
Netherlands (15.5%); United Kingdom (12.3%); Luxembourg (8.9%);
Canada (7.9%); Bermuda (6.2%); Ireland (5.1%); United Kingdom Islands in
the Caribbean (5.0%); Australia (3.4%); Singapore (3.3%); and Switzerland
(2.8%).41 Behind these countries were generally much larger economically
influential nations and would be expected to garner a much larger share of
U.S. investment: Japan, Germany, Mexico, Brazil and France.42 The outward
U.S. FDI was about $4.66 trillion in 2013.43
36

DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 5, at 3.
Id. at 10.
38
Daniel Gross, Big Three, Meet the “Little Eight:” How Foreign Car Factories have Transformed
the American South, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2008, 6:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2
008/12/big_three_meet_the_little_eight.html.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Archive for the ‘Direct Investment’ Category, U.S. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS BLOG (July 31,
2014), http://blog.bea.gov/category/direct-investment.
42
Id.
43
Ibarra-Caton & Mataloni Jr., supra note 34, at 1.
37
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Seven of the top eleven nations (Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Bermuda, Ireland, Islands in the Caribbean, Singapore, and Switzerland) are
exceptionally small and have relatively few resources to trade. American
companies’ investment in these countries may be characterized as outward
FDI, but it is really a transaction that produces little value. To illustrate,
“[f]our-fifths of the position in the Netherlands was accounted for by holding
companies that likely invested the funds in other countries . . . .”44 In 2013,
inward FDI was about $2.764 trillion.45 The nations whose companies have
the largest investments in the U.S. (“inward FDI”) are: United Kingdom
(18.8%); Japan (12.4%); Netherlands (9.9%); Canada (8.6%); France (8.2%);
Switzerland (7.6%); Germany (7.6%); and Luxembourg (7.3%).46 Similarly,
such small countries as the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Luxembourg would
not be expected to have such a large percentage of the inward FDI unless
companies were transferring assets to avoid taxes. The money flowing to and
from and through the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Bermuda, Ireland, UK
Caribbean Islands, Singapore, and Switzerland is real, but the FDI represented
by that money is an illusion. Firms are moving assets on paper to avoid
taxation. The transfers have no economic value.
The eight nations satisfy the general definition of a “tax haven.”47
Tax havens are characterized by their imposition of no or only nominal taxes
(the main criterion); a lack of transparency; laws or administrative practices
that prevent nations from exchanging information on taxation; and an absence
of a requirement of substantial activity before a firm can claim residence in
the tax haven nation.48 In 2009, the Treasury Department listed the
Netherlands as a tax haven, but de-listed it after the Netherlands complained
to the Obama Administration.49 Nonetheless, investors surely consider the
Netherlands a tax haven.
First, although [Netherlands’] headline tax rate is 25.5% . . .
it deliberately offers companies who would not otherwise
seek to be resident within its territory the means to reduce
their tax charges on interest, royalties, dividend and capital
gains income from foreign subsidiaries. This is largely
through an arrangement . . . that exempts dividends and
capital gains from subsidiary companies abroad from
44

Id. at 4.
Id. at 1.
46
Id. at 9.
47
JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 3 (2009), http://www.cob.calpoly.edu/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files/2010/03/Co
ngressional-Report-July-2009.pdf.
48
Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful Tax Practices, OECD 3, 10 (2000), http://www.oe
cd.org/tax/harmful/2090192.pdf.
49
Dorian De Wind, The Netherlands Surprised, “Miffed,” by Obama’s Tax Haven “Slur,” THE
MODERATE VOICE (May 5, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/31053/the-netherlands-surprised-miffedby-obamas-tax-haven-slur/.
45
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corporate income tax in the Netherlands. A second reason is
the unusually large Double Taxation Treaty (DTT) network
[and the U.S. and the Netherlands have a tax treaty] that
substantially reduces withholding taxes on dividend, interest
and royalty payments between treaty countries and the
Netherlands which in combination with the participation
exemption means that investment income enjoys very low
rates of tax in the Netherlands. A third reason is the advance
tax ruling system that gives certainty to multinationals about
how the income of their Dutch subsidiaries will be taxed.50
“Empirical evidence . . . provides little support for this [OECD] belief[]” that
tax treaties, designed to avoid double taxation, promote FDI.51 “Instead, the
data suggest that treaties have either a zero or even a negative effect on FDI .
. . [because] investment in mature subsidiaries may be independent of the
withholding tax reductions treaties achieve[]” and, in a rich irony, treaties
work to reduce tax evasion, which reduces FDI.52
Firms from the United States are booking profits in overseas tax
havens to avoid taxation in the United States.53 But they are not alone.
Multinational corporations transfer about 33% of their FDI through tax
havens.54 Statistics from the Bank of International Settlement show that about
50% of international banking assets and liabilities have been routed through
offshore financial centers since the early 1980s.55
Because of a feature in our [U.S.] tax system known as
deferral, U.S. multinationals can delay paying U.S. taxes on
overseas profits indefinitely, whereas they must pay taxes on
domestic profits in the year they are earned. Overseas profits
are taxed only when and if they are returned to the United
States—and often not even then.56
One study showed that the collective corporate tax rates in the Netherlands,
Luxembourg, Ireland, Bermuda, Switzerland, and Singapore to be 4% or
lower, which is why the U.S. multinational firms establish paper affiliates in
50
Richard Murphy, The Netherlands is a Tax Haven, TAX RESEARCH UK BLOG (Mar. 9, 2009), http://
www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2009/03/09/the-netherlands-is-a-tax-haven/; Tax Convention with the Nethe
rlands, IRS (Jan. 1, 1994), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/nether.pdf.
51
Ronald B. Davies, Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment, UNIV. OF OREGON
1, 2 (June 2003), http://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/jspui/bitstream/1794/116/1/2003-14.pdf.
52
Id.
53
David Kocieniewski, G.E.’s Strategies Let It Avoid Taxes Altogether, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/business/economy/25tax.html?pagewanted=all.
54
Ronen Palan, History of Tax Havens, HISTORY & POLICY (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.historyandpoli
cy.org/policy-papers/papers/history-of-tax-havens.
55
Id.
56
Seth Hanlon, Why We Need a Minimum Tax on U.S. Corporations’ Foreign Profits, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/tax-reform/report/2012/02/10/11064
/why-we-need-a-minimum-tax-on-u-s-corporations-foreign-profits.
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and report a large portion of their profits as emanating from those nations.57
The U.S. firms avoid taxes through four methods.58 One method is to
move intangible property, such as patents and licenses, to their affiliates in
tax haven nations, where royalties may not be taxed.59 For instance, members
of the Rolling Stones, from the UK, and U2, from Ireland, have moved their
profits to the Netherlands, which does not tax royalties.60 Second, the firms
book profits in a tax haven nation through “transfer pricing.”61 The firm may
develop and manage an asset in the U.S. (such as a patent) but assign the
patent to a subsidiary firm in a tax haven nation, where the product is
produced for $1, for example. The product is shipped to the U.S. and sold
there for $2. The firm’s profit of $1 is booked in the tax haven nation,
although the U.S. firm produced, managed, and sold the product solely in the
United States.62
Through “expense allocation,” the third method, a firm will borrow
money in the U.S. to support the product in the above example and receive an
immediate deduction under U.S. tax law, saving the firm 35% of the interest
on the loan.63 The profits are booked to a tax haven nation, where they are
taxed slightly or not at all.64 Fourth, through “profit stripping,” multinational
firms will move profits from a higher-taxing nation to a tax haven.65
These types of profit-stripping strategies do not directly
reduce U.S. tax but they permit U.S. multinationals to shift
income from relatively high-tax foreign countries to low-tax
foreign countries. In so doing, they enhance the rewards for
moving investment outside the United States in the first
place, even to high-tax countries.66
Other than tax avoidance, there is almost no reason for U.S. firms to be
sending and receiving money to and from small tax haven nations. “In 2008
the Government Accountability Office found that corporations pay a 16.1
percent effective tax rate on ‘foreign-source’ income (combining both U.S.
and foreign taxes) and a 25.2 percent rate on U.S.-source income[,]” even as
the tax rates in the tax havens continue to decline.67
The U.S. tax laws that encourage movement to tax havens result in
57

Id.
Id.
59
Id.
60
Lynnley Browning, The Netherlands, the New Tax Shelter Hot Spot, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/04/business/yourmoney/04amster.html?pagewanted=print.
61
Hanlon, supra note 56.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
58

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/2

2016]

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

269

lost jobs in the United States. Multinational firms, which can operate abroad,
have an advantage over the local firms that are taxed under U.S. rates; the
process reduces competitiveness. Large firms with intangible assets, such as
patents and copyrights, can more easily locate in tax haven nations than can
firms with factories used for building infrastructure in the tax haven nations.
This tax system deprives the United States of possibly $100 billion per year.68
Taxation avoidance, alone, contributes to inflated estimates of the
value of FDI. But, also, FDI has significant direct and indirect costs, many
of which are not fully considered in government or non-government reports.
The success of FDI in the United States has to be qualified because foreign
investment has a sizable domestic source in that all firms, domestic or foreign,
can raise funds through borrowing from a parent, issuing stock to obtain
equity capital, or reinvesting their earnings, which foreign firms do frequently
within the United States.69 From the years 1999–2006, only 8% of foreign
investment in the U.S. arrived via a loan from a foreign parent to a U.S.
affiliate.70 “Equity capital raised in the U.S. capital markets accounted for
77% of the share of the funds foreign firms used to invest, with the rest, 15%,
generated from the reinvested earnings of the foreign firms.”71 In contrast,
foreign affiliates of U.S. firms derived 72% of their funds from reinvested
earnings.72 This means that 72% of the value of FDI into the U.S. was raised
inside the United States, not from foreign markets or foreign firms.73
The government’s overstatement of the benefits of FDI is illustrated
in a 2011 Commerce Department estimate of the number of jobs in the U.S.
associated with FDI.74 In surveying FDI activity over the prior decade, the
Commerce Department estimated that FDI provided 5 million jobs in the
U.S.75 This estimate might be accurate, but the impression it gives is that all
the jobs were the result of inward FDI (jobs provided by foreign companies
operating inside the U.S.). But, from 1998 to 2008, foreign firms’
acquisitions of businesses in the U.S. accounted for “90% of the assets of the
businesses that were either newly established or acquired by foreign investors,
95% of the increases in employment, 92 % [sic] of the sales, and 91% of the
investment outlays.”76 In other words, foreign firms bought existing
businesses, where U.S. workers had already been employed.
Most of the “5 million jobs” from foreign investment had been filled

68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Published by eCommons, 2015

GRAVELLE, supra note 47, at 1.
JACKSON, supra note 9, at 17.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 25, at 1.
Id.
JACKSON, supra note 9, at 18.

270

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

by U.S. workers prior to the foreign firms’ acquisitions.77 The Commerce
Department’s statement about jobs is literally true, but misleading. The
statement reads: “During the last ten years, majority-owned U.S. affiliates of
foreign companies have employed between 5-6 [sic] million workers.”78
Following an acquisition, foreign firms may add jobs, but also, “they may use
an acquisition to consolidate or to streamline other operations, which may
result in reducing their level of employment.”79
In a recent ten-year period (1997–2006), foreign firms’ acquisitions
of U.S. firms and U.S. firms’ acquisitions of foreign firms seem to have
paralleled each other.80 Under conventional theory, one would expect that a
lack of or an increase in investment in the U.S. would result in an increased
investment (when investment in the U.S. decreased) or a decreased
investment (when investment in the U.S. increased), respectively, in other
countries. However, the increases and decreases in investment in the U.S.
and other nations paralleled each other. This is a figure of U.S. firms’
acquisitions of foreign companies.81
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This is a figure of foreign firm’s acquisitions of U.S. companies.82

The parallelism of the “similarities in the acquisition activity of U.S. and
foreign firms seem to be counter-intuitive in that those forces that draw U.S.
firms to invest abroad should theoretically be separate from those factors that
draw foreign firms to invest in the United States.”83 Perhaps FDI simply
follows the economic conditions in the United States.
[T]he stronger rate of economic growth in the United States
enhances the profit position of U.S. firms which encourages
them to increase their investments both at home and abroad
as U.S. economic activity also boosts economic performance
in Western Europe and among other developed economies
that have become increasingly linked with the U.S.
economy.84
Thus, inward and outward FDI is reflective of the domestic U.S economy.
Perhaps the policies surrounding FDI are less important to foreign investment
worldwide than the stability and prosperity of the U.S. economy. Domestic
and international economies can be interconnected, but conclusions that FDI
supports a certain number of jobs or a certain percentage of the economy are
likely almost always overstated.
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C. The Future of FDI
Nations have significant incentives to attract FDI even while casting
a wary eye on it. In considering future foreign investment, at least three
significant trends may emerge. First, Chinese contractors (that is, Chinese
government) may be in demand because they have unique experience building
infrastructure, such as 4000 miles of high speed rail lines, the Three Gorges
Dam, and the Hangzhou Bay Bridge. Each of these Chinese projects is
unmatched by any other country. Connected with this expertise is power.
China’s state owned banks can provide diplomatic and financial support so
that Chinese companies can undertake similar projects in other countries.
Second, there will be a rush for natural resources, and, third, this rush
will be supported by diversified global conglomerates.85 There will be the
traditional concerns of capital-exporting countries “that too much of their
capital goes abroad, while capital-importing countries fear foreign control of
domestic assets and the possible macroeconomic instability associated with
rapid changes in foreign investment levels.”86 But these traditional concerns
are not as relevant in regard to China because it severely restricts foreign
companies operating in China while Chinese companies enjoy the benefits of
all other nations’ companies operating in the U.S. or other foreign countries.
As the Obama Administration illustrated, the U.S. will be increasingly reliant
on foreign investment because as the U.S. continues to borrow and increase
its debt, now about $18 trillion,87 it will lack the resources to finance domestic
investment.88
The various states and the federal government, especially the
executive branch, will continue to strongly encourage FDI. But despite public
impressions that foreign investment is widespread in the U.S., the amount of
investment varies greatly from year to year. In the years 1997, 2000, 2003,
2008, 2010, and 2013 inward FDI was approximately $101 billion, $328
billion, $64 billion, $328 billion again, $194 billion,89 and $193 billion90
respectively, a wide range. But from 1982 to 2013, total outward FDI
increased from $208 billion to $4.66 trillion, and total inward FDI increased
from $124.7 billion to $2.764 trillion.91
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Congress has been apprehensive about inward FDI emanating from
some countries. The government used the 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act92
to expropriate chemical and broadcasting assets during World War I from
German and non-German interests and from American Marconi, a radio group
in the U.S. that was controlled by interests in Britain.93 “In 1977, Congress
passed the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the
successor to [the Trading with the Enemy Act] . . . . And in 1988, in response
to concern about growing levels of Japanese investment in the United States,
Congress passed the Exon-Florio amendment[,]” which provided the
President with authority to prevent foreign firms from acquiring certain
domestic and foreign firms in the United States94 and to stop foreign
acquisitions, mergers, or takeovers to preserve national security.95 President
Reagan delegated to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United
States (“CFIUS”) the responsibility of investigating acquisitions by foreign
firms and nations.96 Since 1992, the Byrd Amendment,97 an amendment to
the National Defense Authorization Act, has required that the U.S. investigate
every acquisition by a foreign government. The Byrd Amendment passed
after a French firm, in which France possessed a 60% ownership interest and
controlled 75% of the voting stock, attempted to take over an aerospace
corporation that was a leader in missile technology.98
Following September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Patriot Act,
which provides support for “critical industries,” which are “systems and
assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters.”99 The Trade Act of 2002
provided the President the authority to negotiate trade deals, followed by an
up or down vote of Congress on any agreement (“fast track”), and listed the
objectives of U.S. trade policy.100 That is, the U.S. should reduce trade
barriers and ensure that foreign and U.S. investors enjoy comparable positions
and rights. The Trade Act focuses on eight issues to promote trade:
reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of
national treatment; freeing the transfer of funds relating to
92
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investments; reducing or eliminating performance
requirements, forced technology transfers, and other
unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of
investments; establishing standards for expropriation and
compensation for expropriation; establishing standards for
fair and equitable treatment; providing meaningful
procedures for resolving investment disputes; improving
mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor and
a government; and ensuring the fullest measure of
transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism.101
In 2007, Congress passed the National Security Foreign Investment Reform
and Strengthened Transparency Act, which provided more scrutiny of foreign
firms that are owned or controlled by foreign governments, created an
investigatory process through CFIUS to advise the President, and provided
the President with additional authority to block takeovers by foreign firms.102
The United States has three methods by which to scrutinize foreign
investment that might affect national security. First, the CFIUS process
allows foreign firms to make informal inquiries about potential transactions
in the United States, although the informal process is not detailed in
statutes.103 The informal process is based more on comity and consideration
than on a statute or rule––it works to avoid embarrassment and the
unnecessary expenditure of resources if a firm understands early that the
President will reject its proposed acquisition.104 The formal CFIUS process
permits firms and requires governments to submit proposed transactions with
national security implications to the Committee, which, through a review and
investigation process, has a total of 75 days to provide a recommendation to
the President.105
Second, the National Industrial Security Program coordinates to what
extent private firms may access classified information, such as that within the
defense industry.106 Third, the Strategic Materials Protection Board, under
the Department of Defense, determines “the need to provide a long term
secure supply of materials designated as critical to national security to ensure
that national defense needs are met . . . .”107 This provision arose after a
101
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Chinese firm acquired Magnequench International, a U.S. firm that produced
the minerals necessary to manufacture magnets used in munitions systems
and computer data storage systems.108 It appears that the two Chinese firms
that took control of Magnequench were controlled by two sons-in-law of
Deng Xiaoping, the former head of the Chinese communist party.109 With the
Environmental Protection Agency’s closure of a mine in the United States,
Magnequench, with operations almost solely abroad, was the United States’
only source of rare-earth oxide necessary to make the specialized magnet.110
The U.S. position is that it will block foreign firms’ (like France, Germany,
Japan, and Russia) acquisitions only to protect national security and “critical
infrastructure,” but not to preserve economic security, a criterion that China
will use when considering whether to allow foreign investment.111
III. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES
The prosperity of China and the oil-producing countries is indicative
of American limitations and challenges. Americans send dollars to China and
the Middle Eastern countries for various goods and oil, although the U.S.
importation of oil is decreasing, by almost 24% from 2008 to 2013.112 Those
nations have four kinds of investment entities: sovereign wealth funds,
international reserves, public pension funds, and state-owned enterprises.113
Through their sovereign wealth funds, those nations purchase American
assets (including stock of corporations), lend to U.S. firms, and purchase U.S.
government bonds.114 Sovereign wealth funds are government funds, such as
currency reserves, that governments use to invest in virtually any kind of
asset.
Often, sovereign wealth funds derive their assets from commodity
export revenues or foreign exchange reserves. In part, the exchange rate
allows China to accumulate large dollar reserves, which it uses to replenish
its sovereign wealth fund.115 When China purchases an interest in Blackstone,
which invests in other firms, China’s influence on the other firms is limited.
But concerns grow when China uses its sovereign wealth funds directly to
purchase interests in American corporations, just as Abu Dhabi’s sovereign
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wealth fund did with Citigroup in 2007.116 Middle Eastern nations and China
also operate state-owned enterprises, which complement sovereign wealth
funds. Like private parent firms in any country, state-owned enterprises, such
as the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (“CNOOC”) and Dubai
Customs and Free Zone Corporation (“Dubai Ports World”), operate
businesses and purchase and operate firms in other nations.117
Although declining, the high U.S. current account deficit—$440.4
billion or 2.7% of GDP in 2013118—means that countries with a surplus, such
as Japan, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia have the ability to acquire U.S.
assets and companies with their dollars.119 Compared with private investors,
sovereign wealth funds may also deprive the U.S. of taxable income because
U.S. tax law favors foreign governments. “To the extent that a foreign
government recognizes income that is not exempt from U.S. income tax under
the exception for passive income received by foreign sovereigns, the foreign
government is treated as a corporate resident of its own country.”120 The
important point is that America’s purchases of goods from other nations allow
those nations to diversify by using dollars to acquire interests (through
sovereign wealth funds) in U.S. firms and purchase other firms (through stateowned enterprises), making those creditor/exporter countries stronger.
Even where finding that the U.S. has been lax in regulating China’s
acquisitions, one finds support for FDI.121 For example, the Chinese firm that
acquired Magnequench was controlled by two son-in-laws of Deng Xiaoping,
heads of the Communist Party.122 Moreover, state-owned enterprises create
market distortions because they are supported by the treasury and influence
foreign states. Through “dumping” (selling goods in a foreign market for less
than they are sold at home)123 and other means, they have the ability to
squeeze out U.S. firms and other foreign firms, and they can more easily
corner a market or become a monopoly.
American trepidation over state-owned enterprises increased based
on three transactions that occurred from 2004 to 2006. In 2004, Lenovo, a
116
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large Chinese computer firm announced it would purchase IBM’s personal
computer business.124 Academics at the Chinese Academy of Science, a
government supported institution, started Lenovo in 1984.125 After an
investigation by CFIUS, the government approved the purchase.126 In 2005,
after significant public criticism of the pending purchase of Unocal, a U.S. oil
company, by CNOOC, a company controlled by the Chinese government,
CNOOC withdrew its offer.127 In 2006, Dubai Ports World, a company
controlled by the United Arab Emirates, purchased the Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P & O), a UK company.128 The
purchase included contracts to operate six major ports in the United States.129
After a review by CFIUS, the government approved the purchase.130 But,
after significant criticism from Congress and the public, Dubai Ports World
sold P & O to American International Group.131
Sovereign wealth funds have significant reach. One estimate is that
in 2013 they held about $5.4 trillion in assets.132 China has more than 5,000
investment entities in 10,000 overseas enterprises throughout 172 countries
or economies.133 In foreign markets, China focuses more on merging with and
acquiring existing firms compared to “green field” investment, in which a
foreign firm starts an affiliate.134 In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held
that corporations have a constitutional right to contribute an unlimited amount
of money to independent political groups.135 It would be unwise to believe
that American corporate officers and managers, who might be U.S. citizens,
will not contribute to these political funds—and, in effect, to political
candidates—according to the wishes of their largest shareholders, who will
often be foreign companies and nations.
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IV. NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
FDI creates risks to national security because it places the employees
of nations and their firms in sensitive and non-sensitive positions within U.S.
affiliates that provide products or services in support of national security. In
control of the affiliates, the nations or foreign firms have access to high-tech
information or materials that are used commercially and also in support of
national security. One report, generally supporting Chinese FDI, found four
concerns where nations, as opposed to their private firms, are investing:
“[C]ontrol over strategic assets (ports, pipelines); control over the production
of critical defense inputs (such as military semiconductors); the transfer of
sensitive technology or know-how to a foreign power with hostile intent; and
espionage, sabotage, or other disruptive action.”136 Through acquisitions of
Lenovo and Magnequench, for example, a Chinese state-owned enterprise
and another firm controlled by the Chinese government, respectively, took
control of IBM’s personal computing business and the only source in the U.S.
of minerals (neodymium-iron-boron) used to make high-tech magnets for
military munitions.137
The crimes implicated in FDI are often theft of trade secrets,
economic espionage, and bribery, all of which can be precursors to greater
harm. The U.S. government believes that five areas in particular need more
careful scrutiny.138 They are: (1) China and Russia; (2) information and
communications technology; (3) business information relating to scarce
natural resources; (4) technologies with fast growth (energy, health care,
pharmaceuticals); and (5) military technologies (marine systems, unmanned
aerial vehicles, aero technologies).139 The saliency of these five concerns is
illustrated by the Chinese takeover of Magnequench, through which China
gained control of a rare mineral.
The Chinese takeover was approved by President George W. Bush
after a CFIUS review.140 It appears that CFIUS and the Pentagon had little
concern over the acquisition.141 A small Indiana newspaper described all the
problematic elements where a foreign nation controls an important asset.142
The neodymium-iron-boron magnets made by Magnequench
are a crucial component in the guidance system of cruise
136
Daniel H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, An American Open Door? Maximizing the Benefits of Chinese
Foreign Direct Investment, ASIA SOC’Y 1, 48 (May 2011), http://asiasociety.org/files/pdf/AnAmericanOpe
nDoor_FINAL.pdf.
137
Id. at 45–64.
138
OFFICE OF NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXEC., supra note 28, at 2.
139
Id.
140
Jeffrey St. Clair, The Saga of Magnequench, THE BLOOMINGTON ALT. (Apr. 23, 2006), http://www.
bloomingtonalternative.com/node/7950.
141
Id.
142
See generally id.
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missiles . . . . Magnequench enjoys a near monopoly on this
market niche, supplying 85 percent of the rare-earth magnets
that are used in the servo motors of these guided missiles and
bombs.
. . . On September 15, 2004 Magnequench shuttered [sic] its
last plant in Indiana, fired its 450 workers and began shipping
its machine tools to a new plant in China. . . .
In 1995, Magnequench was purchased from GM by Sextant
Group, an investment company headed by Archibald Cox, Jrthe son [sic] of the Watergate prosecutor. After the takeover,
Cox was named CEO. What few knew at the time was that
Sextant was largely a front for two Chinese companies, San
Huan New Material and the China National Non-Ferrous
Metals Import and Export Corporation. . . . [T]he heads of
both companies were [son] in-laws of the late Chinese
premier Deng Xiaopeng.
Three years later Cox shut down the Anderson plant and
shipped its assembly line to China. . . .
. . . [O]nly months prior to the takeover of Magnequench San
Huan New Materials was cited by US International Trade
Commission for patent infringement and business espionage.
The company was fined $1.5 million. . . .
One of Magnequench’s subsidiaries is a company called GA
Powders, which manufactures the fine granules used in
making the mini-magnets. GA Powders was originally a
Department of Energy project created by scientists at the
Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Lab. It was
spun off to Magnequench in 1998, after Lockheed Martin
took over the operations at INEEL.
In June 2000, Magnequench uprooted the production
facilities for GA Powders from Idaho Falls to a newly
constructed plant in Tianjin, China. This move followed the
transfer to China of high-tech computer equipment from
Magnequench’s shuttered [sic] Anderson plant. . . .
....
Dr. Peter Leitner is an advisor to the Pentagon on matters
involving trade in strategic materials. He says that the
Chinese targeted Magnequench in order to advance their
development of long-range Cruise missiles. China now holds
a monopoly on the rare-earth minerals used in the
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manufacturing of the missile magnets. The only operating
rare-earth mine is located in Batou, China.
....
. . . [The Pentagon admitted] that Magnequench was the only
domestic supplier of the smart bomb magnets (Hitachi holds
the other contract), but that it had no idea that company was
owned by the Chinese or that it was packing up for Tianjin.143
One commentator characterized China’s Magnequench acquisition as an
“unfortunate business necessity.”144 Magnequench stopped producing
magnets to focus on “more profitable and less-commoditized activity of
innovation and design of rare earth powders used in such magnets[]”145 and,
therefore, according to “these real world conditions, Magnequench’s exit
from the neodymium magnet production business and their closure of the
Valparaiso facility is not only rational but an unfortunate business
necessity.”146 But, that kind of business necessity, used in corporate law to
exculpate officers and directors from liability, should create some hesitation
because such principles like business necessity and the drive for economic
gain provide little consideration of national security interests.
Most of the convictions arising from the Economic Espionage Act of
1996 resulted after employees of U.S. firms stole trade secrets to benefit
China.147 While the Espionage Act of 1917 prohibits the misappropriation of
classified government information,148 the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
prohibits the misappropriation of commercial information, such as trade
secrets, for the benefit of a foreign nation.149 Some representative cases
include the following, with the firm/victim in parentheses:
2014: Defendants Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu,
Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui (Westinghouse and other U.S.
companies)—cyber-espionage including theft of trade
secrets—to benefit a Chinese state owned enterprise (charges
pending).150
2013: Defendant Hanjuan Jin (Motorola)—theft of trade
secrets for a mobile communications system for the benefit
143
Id.; see also Tkacik Jr., supra note 109; Charles W. Freeman III, Remember the Magnequench: An
Object Lesson in Globalization, THE WASH. QUARTERLY 61, 62 (Jan. 2009), http://csis.org/files/publicatio
n/twq09januaryfreeman.pdf.
144
Freeman III, supra note 143, at 68.
145
Id. at 67.
146
Id. at 68.
147
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–294, § 1832, 110 Stat. 3009, 3489 (1996).
148
H.R. 291, 65th Cong. (1st Sess. 1917).
149
Economic Espionage Act § 1832.
150
United States of America v. Wang Dong, Sun Kailiang, Wen Xinyu, Huang Zhenyu, Gu Chunhui,
TRADE SECRETS INST. (May 1, 2014), http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/cases/united-states-america-v-wang-dongsun-kailiang-wen-xinyu-huang-zhenyu-gu-chunhui.
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of China (conviction affirmed on appeal).151
2013: Defendants Clark Alan Roberts and Sean Edward
Howley (Goodyear)—theft of trade secrets for tire building
for the benefit of a company with a contract with China
(convictions upheld).152
2012: Defendant Yuan Li (Sanofi Aventis)—economic
espionage—to benefit the Chinese chemical producer,
Xiamon KAK Science & Technology (chemical compounds)
(convicted).153
2011:
Defendant Kexue Huang (Dow)—economic
espionage—to benefit Chinese universities (organic
insecticides) (convicted).154
2011: Defendant Xiang Dong Yu (Ford)—product engineer
at Ford stole engine-transmission and electric power supply
systems for the Chinese automaker Beijing Automotive
Industry Corp. (convicted).155
2010: Defendant David Yen Lee (Valspar)—formerly a
technical director at Valspar Corp., stole secret formulas for
paints and coatings from Valspar's offices for a competitor in
China (convicted).156
2008: Defendant Xiaodong Sheldon MengMeng (Quantum
3D)—economic espionage by misappropriating a trade
secret, known as “Mantis 1.5.5,” from his former employer,
Quantum3D, with the intent to benefit China’s Navy
Research Center in Beijing (convicted).157
2006: Defendants Fei Ye and Ming Zhong (Sun
Microsystems and Transmeta)—convicted of economic
espionage for stealing trade secrets for the benefit of the city
151

United States v. Hanjuan Jin, 733 F.3d 718, 719 (7th Cir. 2013).
United States v. Howley, 707 F.3d 575, 577–83 (6th Cir. 2013).
153
Press Release, The United States Attorney’s Office District of New Jersey, Former Research
Chemist at Global Pharmaceutical Company Sentenced to 18 Months in Prison for Theft of Trade Secrets
(May 7, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nj/Press/files/Li,%20Yuan%20Sentencing%20News
%20Release.html.
154
Karen Gullo, Ex-Dow Scientist Who Stole Secrets Gets 7 Years, 3 Months Prison, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Dec. 22, 2011, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-21/ex-dow-scientistgets-more-than-seven-years-in-prison-for-stealing-secrets.
155
Ex-Ford Engineer Sentenced for Trade Secrets Theft, REUTERS (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2011/04/13/us-djc-ford-tradesecrets-idUSTRE73C3FG20110413.
156
Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Former Paint Manufacturing Chemist Sentenced to 15
Months in Prison for Stealing Trade Secrets Valued up to $20 Million (Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/c
hicago/press-releases/2010/cg120810-1.htm.
157
Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced for Economic Espionage
(June 18, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-nsd-545.html.
152
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of Hangzhou and the Province of Zhejiang, China
(convicted).158
China and its firms and agents are not alone in their misbehavior. But
the theft of trade secrets for the benefit of China and the bribery of foreign
officials for the benefit of foreign firms should not be overstated or
understated. Theft and bribery have occurred throughout history, although,
with new technology, those crimes can now cause greater harm. Foreign
trade, from which the crimes originate, benefits the United States. A large
distinction today is that more dangerous weapons are available to more
dangerous people in more nations. Even a small component can have great
significance. The theft of trade secrets is a tactical loss that could be very
dangerous if it leads to military assets falling into an adversary’s hands or
prevents the U.S. from obtaining necessary materiel. Bribery of foreign
officials destabilizes political processes and nations and can lead to regional
conflict.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. was designed to
ameliorate the national security risks of inward FDI.159 Created by President
Ford’s Executive Order in 1975, CFIUS is charged with recommending to the
President whether he should block a proposed acquisition of a U.S. firm by a
foreign firm or government.160 The Committee chair is the Treasury
Department and its other members include the Departments of Justice,
Homeland Security, Commerce, Defense, State, and Energy, and the Offices
of the U.S. Trade Representative for Science & Technology Policy.161 The
Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Labor are non-voting,
ex-officio members.162 Observers and participants include the Office of
Management & Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, the National
Security Council, the National Economic Council, and the Homeland Security
Council.163
While it would be difficult to improve on its structure, with its crosssection of agencies, the Committee’s composition may create conflicts of
interest. As noted, since the Carter Administration adopted a neutral policy
on FDI, subsequent presidents have been proponents of inward foreign
investment. Typically, when any firm, foreign or domestic, employs
158
Michael Barkoviak, Two Silicon Valley Engineers Receive One Year Prison Sentences, DAILY TECH
(Nov. 24, 2008, 4:22 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/Two+Silicon+Valley+Engineers+Receive+One+Ye
ar+Prison+Sentences/article13503c.htm.
159
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/Pages/Committee-on-Foreign-Investment-inUS.aspx (last updated Dec. 20, 2012, 1:37 PM).
160
Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975), reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. 13456 (2008).
161
Composition of CFIUS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/interna
tional/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last updated Dec. 1, 2010, 8:08 AM).
162
Id.
163
Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. 990 (1971–1975), reprinted as amended in 3 C.F.R. 13456 (2008).
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American workers, presidents are pleased. The heads of all the agencies
within CFIUS are political appointees who depend on the President’s favor
and his re-election (if applicable) for their jobs. The approval of a foreign
firm that promises jobs, which will at least indirectly benefit the members of
CFIUS, might be incompatible with a truly independent review of the foreign
firm’s application to conduct business in the United States.
Still, a better composition of CFIUS would be difficult to obtain.
Members of Congress and their staff members do not have the interests or
expertise of executive agencies. Even assuming that Congress would provide
new scrutiny, conflicts of interest exist because members of Congress will
usually want to encourage investments within their districts and states.
Usually unaware of the national security implications of an acquisition of a
local company by a foreign firm, the constituents of the member of Congress
will almost always lean one way: toward job retention or creation and the
approval of foreign investment. Private consultants might be helpful in the
CFIUS process, but the government could not provide them with all the
classified information necessary to make an informed recommendation to the
President. Using consultants would be expensive and time-consuming.
Still, American institutions and people should more thoroughly
scrutinize not only the foreign firm or nation wanting to acquire the factory
next door, but also the foreign government officials who are considering the
acquisition. For example, despite reviewing the acquisition of Magnequench,
CFIUS was apparently unaware that the Chinese government or Communist
Party controlled the purchasing firm.164 Indeed, pressures on CFIUS should
be recognized. During a recent five-year period, 2008 to 2012, CFIUS
received 538 proposed investment transactions.165 Companies withdrew some
of their proposals, but 87% of the 538 transactions were completed.166
The foreign firm must provide CFIUS a “summary setting forth the
essentials of the transaction, including a statement of the purpose of the
transaction, and its scope, both within and outside of the United States;”167
“[a] good faith approximation of the net value of the interest acquired in the
U.S. business[;]”168 the “name of any and all financial institutions involved in
the transaction, including as advisors, underwriters, or a source of financing
for the transaction;”169 and with “respect to a transaction structured as an
acquisition of assets of a U.S. business, a detailed description of the assets of
the U.S. business being acquired, including the approximate value of those
164

62.

St. Clair, supra note 140; see Tkacik Jr., supra note 109; see also Freeman III, supra note 143, at

165
JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 22 (2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf.
166
Id.
167
31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c)(1)(i) (1996).
168
31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c)(1)(viii) (1996).
169
31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c)(1)(ix) (1996).
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assets . . . .”170 The Committee may not release the firm’s confidential
information to the public so as not to disclose trade secrets or harm the firm’s
market position, although the Committee may release relevant information for
judicial or administrative proceedings.171 During the review, the Director of
National Intelligence must evaluate the transaction for “any threats to national
security posed by the transaction.”172 If, upon completion of the review, any
CFIUS member finds a threat to national security, CFIUS will conduct an
investigation and issue a recommendation to the President.173
Under the federal regulations, the “Committee will continue its
practice of focusing narrowly on genuine national security concerns alone,
not broader economic or other national interests.”174 But the Committee and
the President may consider factors related to national security, which are
many and broadly stated.175 They include: domestic production for national
defense; capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet defense
requirements; control of domestic industries and commercial activity by
foreign firms; potential effects of the transaction on the sale of military goods,
equipment, or technology to a country that supports terrorism or proliferates
missile technology or chemical and biological weapons; potential effects on
U.S. technological leadership related to national security; security-related
impact on critical infrastructure; potential effects on critical infrastructure;
effects on critical technologies; foreign government-controlled transaction;
review (of foreign country-controlled transaction) of the country’s
nonproliferation control regimes, cooperation with counter-terrorism efforts,
and potential for diversion of technologies with military applications;
projection of U.S. energy needs; and other factors as the President or the
Committee deem appropriate.176 CFIUS is limited to reviewing “covered
transactions,” in which a foreign firm wants to take control of a U.S. firm,
with “control” often defined as more than a 10% ownership stake or the ability
to steer the U.S. firm through control of management or the board of
directors.177 Review of “critical infrastructure” includes “systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
[national] security[] . . . .”178 Where there was concern about an acquisition,
in 2006, a French company, Alcatel, was permitted to acquire Lucent
Technologies by promising to limit its access to Bell Labs, which is important
170

31 C.F.R. § 800.402(c)(1)(ix)(2) (1996).
31 C.F.R. § 800.702 (1996); see generally JACKSON, supra note 165, at 19.
172
JACKSON, supra note 165, at 16.
173
Id. at 25.
174
Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, FED.
REGISTER (Nov. 21, 2008), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2008/11/21/E8-27525/regulations-per
taining-to-mergers-acquisitions-and-takeovers-by-foreign-persons#h-7.
175
JACKSON, supra note 165, at 21.
176
50 U.S.C. § 2170 (1996); see also JACKSON, supra note 165, at 21.
177
JACKSON, supra note 165, at 13.
178
42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).
171
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to U.S. communications systems.179 In contrast, in 2008 Bain Capital and
Huawei Technologies withdrew their offer to acquire the network and
software firm, 3Com, for $2.2 billion, due to an inability to successfully
negotiate a mitigation agreement with members of CFIUS.180 The 2015 report
issued by CFIUS, covering the year 2013, indicated closer inspection of
transactions involving Chinese investors.181 “In 2013, for the second year in
a row, Chinese investment in the United States accounted for the largest
number of covered transactions reviewed by CFIUS,” according to an
analysis by the Cadwalader law firm.182 Indeed, in a proposed $2.9 billion
transaction in 2016, CFIUS blocked Chinese investors, GO Scale Capital and
GSR Ventures, from purchasing a controlling interest in a unit of Phillips, a
Netherlands company, because the unit produced gallium nitride, which can
be used to produce microchips in weapons systems.183
V. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
As a base, the 2012 Model U.S. BIT provides most-favored-nation
treatment to investors of a Party (nation).184 That is, the U.S. must provide
the same rights to all firms of nations that enjoy the most beneficial trading
status (“most favored”).185 Under the Model BIT Treaty, the U.S. “shall
accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less favorable than that it
accords, in like circumstances, to its investors with respect to the
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and
sale or other disposition of investments in its territory.”186 Most-favorednation status often applies to the standards a foreign firm confronts when
entering a nation, such as tariffs, while national treatment, also provided
under the Model BIT, provides equal treatment, in comparison with U.S.
firms, once a foreign firm enters the United States.187 Thus, under the Model
BIT, the U.S. “shall accord to investors of the other Party treatment no less
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors.”188
While global trade is governed through nations’ membership in the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) (and, before the WTO, the General
179

JACKSON, supra note 165, at 7.
Id. at 23.
181
Michael Liu et al., Investing in the United States: CFIUS Concerns for Chinese Investors,
CADWALADER (July 9, 2015), http://www.cadwalader.com/resources/clients-friends-memos/investing-inthe-united-states-cfius-concerns-for-chinese-investors.
182
Id.
183
Paul Mozur & Jane Perlez, Concern Grows in U.S. Over China’s Drive to Make Chips, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/technology/concern-grows-in-us-over-chinas-driveto-make-chips.html.
184
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, UNITED STATES TRADE COMM’N 1, 7 (2012),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
180

Published by eCommons, 2015

286

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:3

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), global FDI does not operate under a
comparable international monitoring or dispute-resolution system.189 BITs
provide foreign firms in host nations with protections and a resolution
mechanism in the event they have a dispute with the host nation, which
includes any federal, state, or local governmental unit.190 BITs originated in
the late 1950s to supplement the slender customary law protections that firms
possessed in foreign nations.191
The number of treaties increased significantly after 1974, when the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States, which held that a nation’s domestic law determines
whether compensation for expropriation would be provided.192 BITs would
provide some protection against expropriation, and they proliferated. The
United Nations estimated that at the end of 2007 there were about 2,608
BITs,193 entered into by 177 countries.194
Developed countries do not generally enter into BITS with each
other, in large part because they are members of the OECD,195 which
coordinates dispute resolution, such as that regarding the resolution of tax
disputes.196 Under BITs, if there is a dispute between a foreign firm and a host
nation, it will be resolved through binding arbitration, often under the World
Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”).197 The 2012 Model U.S. BIT contains a security exception, which
provides that the treaty shall not “preclude a Party from applying measures
that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to
the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the
protection of its own essential security interests.”198 The 2012 U.S. Model
BIT, compared with the 2004 Model, does provide additional environmental
and labor protections, mainly that Parties may not waive their domestic
189
See generally Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1959-1999, UNITED NATIONS (2000), http://www.unct
ad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf (“UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development]
serves as the focal point within the United Nations Secretariat for all matters related to foreign direct
investment and transnational corporations.”).
190
Luke Eric Peterson, Human Rights and Bilateral Investment Treaties, RIGHTS & DEMOCRACY 1, 9
(2009), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dd-rd/E84-36-2009-eng.pdf.
191
Id. at 12.
192
STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 152 (Cambridge University Press
2011).
193
Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2007–June 2008), UNITED NATIONS
1, 2 (2008), http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20081_en.pdf.
194
Jennifer L. Tobin & Marc L. Busch, A Bit Is Better Than A Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Preferential Trade Agreements, 62 WORLD POLITICS 1, 4 (2010), http://faculty.georgetown.edu/mlb66/BI
Ts%20and%20PTAs.pdf.
195
UNITED NATIONS, supra note 189, at 4.
196
Dispute Resolution, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ctp/dispute/ (last visited Mar. 27, 2015).
197
UNITED STATES TRADE COMM’N, supra note 184, at 26; see also Cases, INT’L CTR. FOR THE
SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Index.jsp (last visited Mar. 27, 2015);
see also ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, INT’L CTR. FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES
(Apr. 10, 2006), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/main-eng.htm.
198
UNITED STATES TRADE COMM’N, supra note 184, at 21.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol40/iss3/2

2016]

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT

287

environmental and labor laws as a means to encourage investment.199
The 2012 Model BIT provides that foreign investors in a host nation
shall be provided at least the minimum protections afforded under customary
international law.200 When there is an “investor-state dispute,” at the option
of either the firm or the U.S., the dispute must be submitted to binding
arbitration.201 In practice, it has been and probably only will be foreign firms
that will select arbitration because the U.S. is comfortable with disputes being
resolved through its court system. Courts are also more predictable than
arbitrators in that court decisions are based on federal and state law, which is
relatively well-established in comparison to customary international law.
Under the U.S. bilateral treaties, a panel of three arbitrators will decide an
investor-state dispute without considering national law and by relying on only
their interpretation of customary international law, which is by nature
amorphous, usually unwritten, and relatively undeveloped.202 In a sense, the
BIT elevates the foreign firm to an unusually high status in that, like a nation,
it can compel the U.S. government to submit to arbitration. Despite
controversy over the binding-arbitration process in BITs and FTAs, the U.S.
has prevailed in every final arbitration decision (nine) in which a foreign firm
has taken the U.S. to arbitration under Chapter 11 of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”).203 Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, Canada and
Mexico have paid investors $269.6 million in ten different cases.204
The most prominent case involving the U.S. as a respondent was
Glamis Gold, which arose in 2009.205 Glamis was a Canadian firm with an
affiliate in the U.S. that complained that a California mining law resulted in
the expropriation of Glamis’ property.206 California passed a law that required
backfilling and restoration of open pit mines near sacred sites of Native
Americans.207 Rather than pursue various state and federal permits, Glamis
demanded arbitration under NAFTA’s Chapter 11, which provided that an
“investor of a Party may submit to arbitration under . . . a claim that another
Party has breached . . . and that the investor has incurred loss or damage by
reason of, or arising out of, that breach.”208 In 2009, the arbitration panel
199
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa
/prs/ps/2012/04/188199.htm.
200
UNITED STATES TRADE COMM’N, supra note 184, at 7.
201
Id. at 26.
202
SCHWEBEL, supra note 192, at 152.
203
Table of Foreign Investor-State Cases and Claims under NAFTA and Other U.S. “Trade” Deals,
PUBLIC CITIZEN 1, 2–10 (Feb. 2014), http://www.citizen.org/documents/investor-state-chart1.pdf.
204
Id. at 10–30.
205
Elizabeth Whitsitt & Damon Vis-Dunbar, Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States of America: Tribunal
Sets a High Bar for Establishing Breach of “Fair and Equitable Treatment” under NAFTA, INV. TREATY
NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://www.iisd.org/itn/2009/07/14/glamis-gold-ltd-v-united-states-of-americatribunal-sets-a-high-bar-for-establishing-breach-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-nafta.
206
Id.
207
PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 203, at 6.
208
North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1116(1)(a)–(b) (1994).
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dismissed the complaint, concluding that, while the regulations were costly to
Glamis, the cost did not constitute an expropriation.209
Corporations or investors have brought 22 arbitration cases against
the U.S. under NAFTA.210 But significant U.S. liability is a theoretical
possibility. For example, Loewen, a Canadian funeral home company, sought
$725 million from the U.S. because it lost a damage award in a Mississippi
state court.211 It demanded investor-state arbitration in 1998.212 The case was
dismissed on procedural grounds, but the arbitration tribunal found that
private contract disputes resolved in state courts are subject to NAFTA’s
jurisdiction.213
Methanex was a Canadian corporation that challenged California’s
prohibition on methyl tert-butyl ether (“MTBE”), which pollutes
groundwater.214 In 1999, Methanex demanded $970 million, alleging that the
prohibition on MTBE harmed its ability to sell methanol, a chemical in
MTBE.215 The arbitration tribunal found that the connection between the
MTBE ban and methanol was not sufficient as a basis for liability.216 In the
cases brought against the U.S., corporations or investors have demanded
nearly $50 billion.217
Although U.S. BITs and FTAs are increasing—the U.S. has FTAs in
effect with 20 countries218 and 48 BITs219—cases like Glamis Gold raise
fundamental issues about the nature and value of U.S. foreign policy and the
agreements that emanate from it. On the most basic political level, the binding
arbitration agreements upset constitutional federalism. Certainly, no business
entity other than a foreign firm acting in reliance on an arbitration clause in a
BIT or FTA could ever take the U.S. government to only one forum (three
arbitrators) that would, once and for all, decide the disputed issue. The only
constitutional exception to this rule is the original jurisdiction provision in
Article III of the Constitution:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the
other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
209
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appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make.220
Through the President’s authority to conduct foreign affairs and the Senate’s
authority to ratify treaties, the U.S. has afforded foreign commercial firms the
kind of expedited resolution process that the Constitution’s founders reserved
for states and high foreign officials as a method to deter significant conflict.
The exceptional right that foreign commercial firms operating inside
the United States possess to take their cases first (and finally) to binding
arbitration reflects more on the allure of international commerce and inward
and outward foreign investment, as well as on the power of corporate
interests, than on the U.S. government’s fidelity to federalism. After all,
depriving all federal and state agencies and courts, as well as all state
governors and legislatures, of the power to regulate aspects of commercial
matters places a big, round dent in the armor of separation of powers. To
some degree, this raises the specter of the substantive non-regulation of
economic matters that was popular during the Lochner era.221 Indeed, some
have argued that this modern U.S. approach will presage a decline in health,
environmental, and labor standards:
These firms have access under the deals to an ‘investor-state’
enforcement system, which allows them to skirt national
court systems and privately enforce their extraordinary new
investor privileges by directly challenging national
governments before extrajudicial tribunals. These investorstate cases are litigated outside any domestic legal system in
special international arbitration bodies of the World Bank
and the United Nations. A three-person panel composed of
private attorneys listens to arguments in the case, with the
power to award an unlimited amount of taxpayer dollars to
corporations. Because the mechanism elevates private firms
and investors to the same status as sovereign governments, it
amounts to a privatization of the justice system.222
Under NAFTA and at the instance of the trucking industry, the Obama
Administration agreed to a pilot program to permit Mexican trucks into the
United States, although the Mexican trucks have poorer safety records than
U.S. trucks.223
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Under FTAs and BITs, if foreign firms have economic procedural and
substantive due process in the United States, then U.S. multinational firms
will have similar substantive and procedural protections in the nations that are
parties to the agreements and treaties. Arbitration might be the only realistic
dispute resolution process that is accessible to U.S. firms in developing
nations. In contrast, given the stable U.S. legal system, foreign investors have
much less need for arbitration for their operations in the United States.
In providing this protection, the U.S. may have undercut federalism
and weakened the ability of all governmental entities to regulate in the health,
environmental, and labor areas. Opponents of binding arbitration may fear
that an unpredictable and unfavorable arbitration decision in regard to
expropriation will result in U.S. taxpayers having to compensate a foreign
firm under a customary international law standard that would never apply
under U.S. law. In considering health, environmental, and labor standards,
governmental entities in the U.S. would find it politically impossible to place
more stringent regulations on U.S. firms than they are allowed to place on
foreign firms under BITs. As a result, if they fear having to pay compensation
for expropriation, they may lessen health, environmental, and labor
regulations for everyone.
The benefits of the FTAs may not be uniform. By the end of 2013,
the U.S. trade deficit with FTA partner countries was more than five times
higher than before the FTAs went into effect. According to Public Citizen:
The aggregate U.S. trade deficit with FTA partners has
increased by more than $147 billion (inflation-adjusted)
since the FTAs were implemented. In contrast, the aggregate
deficit with all non-FTA countries has decreased by more
than $130 billion since 2006 (the median entry date of
existing FTAs). Two reasons: a sharp increase in imports
from FTA partners and significantly lower export growth to
FTA partners than to non-FTA nations over the last decade.
Using the Obama administration’s net exports-to-jobs ratio,
the FTA trade deficit surge implies the loss of about 800,000
U.S. jobs. 224
Perhaps at the expense of U.S. workers, the U.S. government has used FTAs
and BITs to promote foreign policy. In 2011, the U.S. ratified trade
agreements with Korea, Colombia, and Panama.225 According to former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the agreements are important not only for
224
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their economic benefits but also because the “three important partners [are] in
strategically vital regions.”226
But the FTAs have been criticized for their practical implications.227
North Korea and China may produce goods labeled “Korean” and export them
to the United States through South Korea, in effect increasing the U.S. trade
imbalance with China and skirting U.S. sanctions against North Korea. The
U.S. trade agreement with Colombia does not provide for protections of
Colombia’s workers, although Colombia has a high rate of death for trade
unionists, where fifty-one labor leaders were killed in 2010.228 With a
relatively small economy, Panama is beneficial to investors mainly as the
world’s second best tax haven, but not very beneficial economically to anyone
else.229
VI. CONCLUSION: FDI WITH EYES WIDE OPEN
Almost all reports indicate that FDI provides economic benefits to
host nations, including the U.S. The findings in this Article confirm that view
but indicate that the value of FDI has been overstated and that the costs and
risks associated with foreign investment have been understated. When
foreign firms establish or purchase affiliates in the U.S., the firms bring
essential competition and new ideas to the marketplace, through which they
make American products and workers better. Still, absent foreign firms, U.S.
employers would have employed many of the workers who now count as
beneficiaries of FDI, albeit in a less competitive environment.
Moreover, a large majority of these jobs existed when the foreign firm
acquired the U.S. affiliate. “In addition, while foreign direct investment does
have positive net benefits for the economy as a whole, empirical research has
not established that such benefits remain unambiguously positive when tax
and financial incentives are offered as inducements.”230 With jobs in
manufacturing, which has higher-than-normal wages, the employees of
foreign firms are often managers, professionals, and scientists. The
government conclusion, about 5 million jobs with foreign firms providing
30% more in average compensation, is incomplete or misleading.231 The
compensation of U.S. workers employed through FDI is naturally higher than
the average compensation in the U.S. because the jobs are in higher-paying
sectors.
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Some undesirable individual, corporate, and national behaviors are
associated with FDI, including tax evasion or avoidance, theft of trade secrets,
economic espionage, and bribery of officials of developing nations. Despite
their diminutive nature in world commerce, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg, for example, are among the top nations sending foreign
investment into the United States. It is likely that individuals and firms
transferred their assets to and from the Netherlands and Luxembourg simply
to avoid taxation, with no net economic benefit to the United States.
Foreign firms with affiliates in the U.S. must comply with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. In just a six-year period (2008–2014), after lodging
criminal and civil bribery accusations against some of the world’s most
prominent corporations (Siemens, KBR/Halliburton, BAE, Total, Alcoa,
Snamprogetti, Technip, JGC Corporation, Daimler, and Weatherford), the
U.S. reached settlements worth $3.82 billion.232 Despite such recurring risks,
the United States’ experience with FDI has been seemingly profitable,
although the FDI has been mainly with firms in ten developed nations (United
Kingdom, Japan, Netherlands, Germany, Canada, Switzerland, France,
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Australia).233 By 2012, FDI was about 16% of
the U.S. GDP,234 and in 2013, foreign firms’ direct investment into the U.S.
increased to $272.6 billion,235 to a total of $2.8 trillion.236
To enhance FDI, the U.S. relies on FTAs and BITs, mainly with
developing nations. BITs with developed nations are unnecessary because
multilateral treaties bind the nations already, and all the developed nations are
members of the OECD, which may coordinate dispute resolution. Moreover,
developed nations have legal systems that provide stability. A main reason
that the U.S. enters into BITs is to ensure that U.S. firms operating abroad
will not be expropriated by a foreign nation without compensation. The
affiliates of foreign firms operating inside the U.S. have constitutional and
statutory protection against the government’s taking of their property. But if
a foreign firm has a dispute with the U.S. government, under a BIT the firm
may take the dispute to binding arbitration rather than to federal court.
Binding arbitration is useful, but the U.S. should re-consider whether it should
be available in all cases involving health, labor, and environmental
regulations.
Various costs and risks regarding national security and law
enforcement have not been adequately evaluated. Foreign firms that question
whether the U.S. government will try to block their mergers with or
232
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acquisitions of U.S. firms on national security grounds may ask CFIUS to
provide an informal or formal opinion. Where a foreign government is
seeking to acquire a U.S. firm and national security is implicated, CFIUS,
comprised of government agencies and led by the Treasury Department, must
conduct a formal investigation and make a recommendation to the President,
who will approve or disapprove the acquisition. Through CFIUS, the U.S.
has adequate means to prevent nations and dubious foreign firms from
acquiring critical companies or assets so long as economic interests are
subordinated to national security.
The U.S. should continue to promote FDI but better understand its
costs and risks. First, tax laws should be changed to prevent paper transfers
of assets solely to avoid taxation. Through inward and outward FDI, U.S.
corporations avoid reasonable taxation through operating in tax haven
nations. Second, the U.S. should monitor foreign sovereign wealth funds and
state-owned enterprises more closely. In considering their political and social
interests, the foreign funds and enterprises are more than amoral corporate
entities focused on profit. Their national interests are different from, and in
many instances contrary to, the interests of the United States. Thus, third, the
U.S. should ensure that enterprising nations and foreign firms are prevented
from acquiring national-security-important U.S. firms.
Fourth, the United States must ensure that foreign firms and nations
are excluded from de facto participation in state and federal elections. Under
Citizens United, U.S. affiliates, even when controlled by foreign firms or
nations, may contribute unlimited sums of money to independent U.S.
political organizations. Those organizations are never truly independent from
political candidates. Under Citizens United, the U.S. corporate affiliates of
foreign firms have the right to financially support political groups with
unlimited payments, but the government has the right to make them disclose
their expenditures and to identify the members of the groups and their
supporters. In sum, the U.S. needs additional information and disclosure
about the value of FDI and its risks, especially where foreign firms may
influence the U.S. political process or its national security.
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